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Challenging Sexual Preference
Discrimination in Private
Employment
The legal rights of gay' people have received increased protection in
recent years, but progress has been painfully slow. Homosexual conduct
may still be grounds for extensive persecution.2 Employment discrimina-
tion against gay people is still pervasive. Discrimination against gay peo-
ple in public employment has been curtailed somewhat,3 although if a gay
person "flaunts" his or her homosexuality, 4 is employed as a teacher,5 or
serves as a member of the military,6 dismissal may still be approved by the
courts. Contrary to the limited gains that have been made in the context
of public employment, discrimination against gay people in private em-
ployment 7 has been subjected to minimal examination and limited regu-
lation.
1. The term "gay" is synonymous with homosexual and the two terms will be used
interchangeably in this Comment. "Homosexuality" has been defined as "1: atypical sexuality
characterized by manifestation of sexual desire toward a member of one's own sex 2: erotic activity
with a member of one's own sex ... " A "homosexual" is defined as "one who is inclined toward or
practices homosexuality." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1085 (1966). It is
difficult to draw a clear line between those persons who could be labeled homosexual and those who
could be labeled heterosexual. Courts have attached the "homosexual" label to persons with widely
varying characteristics and experiences. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of
Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799,800-04 (1979). Kinsey concluded that
sexual preference exists on a continuum. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN
THE HUMAN MALE 638-41 (1948). A more recent study of the Institute for Sex Research also examines
the homosexual-heterosexual continuum. A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, HoMOSEXUALITIEs-A STUDY OF
DIVERSITY AMONG MEN & WOMEN 53-61 (1978). See also Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual
Minorities: A Crisis ofthe Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 1131 (1979). A definition of a
homosexual person for purposes of this Comment would be of little value. Therefore, the term
"homosexual," as used in this Article, simply refers to those persons labeled by the courts as
homosexual.
2. In 1979, 29 states and the District of Columbia still had statutes making homosexual acts a
criminal offense. Rivera, supra note 1, at 949-51. The constitutionality of the Virginia sodomy statute
was recently upheld against due process, freedom of expression, and privacy attacks. Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E. D. Va. 1975), Af'dmem.,425 U.S. 901(1976). Due
to these and other state and federal statutes, aliens may be denied naturalization, Immigration &
Naturaliation Service Interpretations § 316.1(f)(7)(1976); security clearances may be denied, 32
C.F.R. § 155.5(h) (1978), Rivera, supra note 1, at 829-37; and applicants for professional licenses may
be refused, McLaughlin v. Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 111 Cal. Rptr. 353
(1973); Florida Bar v. Kay, 232 So. 2d 378 (Fla.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 956 (1970); State v. Kimball, 96
So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1957); Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 301 (1959), contra, In re Kimball, 40 A.D.2d 252, 339
N.Y.2d 302, rev'dper curiam, 33 N.Y.2d 586,301 N.E.2d 436 (1973); Rivera, supra note 1, at857 n. 349.
Homosexual conduct may be grounds for refusal or removal of the child custody rights of a
homosexual parent. In re Jane B., 85 Misc. 2d 515, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Rivera, supra
note i, at 883-904.
3. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Rivera, supra note 1, at 813-25.
4. McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
5. Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 879 (1977). But see Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214,461 P.2d 375,82 Cal. Rptr. 175
(1969).
6. Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 414 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 852
(D.C.Cir. 1978); Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Rivera, supra note 1, at 837-
55.
7. "Private employment" is defined, for the purposes of this Article, as any employmentnot in a
federal, state, or local government position.
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Legal theories available for redress of discrimination in private
employment include assertion of rights based upon Title VII,' 42 U.S.C. §
1985(c), 9 the National Labor Relations Act, 0 common-law tort and
contracts doctrines, and state and local statutes and ordinances. This
Comment will examine the issues that accompany the process of securing
protection for the rights of gay people in private employment. It will
examine current legal responses to private employment discrimination
against gay people and will consider the applicability of theories based on
federal civil rights statutes, state statutes, and the common law attempts
to remedy such discrimination. This Comment then will review the policy
considerations that often are an essential element of an attorney's
advocacy of gay clients' rights and of a campaign for protective legislation.
In conclusion, this Comment will recommend a course of future action
that may facilitate protection of the rights of gay people.
I. THE LAW-WHAT TO MAKE OF IT
A. Overview
The rights of gay people in private employment have received little
legislative protection. There exist no federal or state statutes that expressly
prohibit discrimination against gay people in private employment;
recently enacted city and county ordinances provide protection for
privately employed gay people in only scattered areas of the United
States. 11
Few reported American cases address the rights of gay people in
private employment. Most of those cases that do face the issues summarily
deny claims of protection brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.12 Two recent cases, however, have undertaken a relatively
thorough analysis of Title VII attacks on private employment discrimina-
tion against gay people.
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. 13 was a consolidation
of two civil rights actions claiming employment discrimination based on
sexual preference. 14 The claimants alleged violations of Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1985(c). 15 The plaintiffs in one action were three gay males. One
was allegedly not hired because of his homosexuality, the other two were
allegedly forced to quit by the harassment of co-workers and supervisors.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17(1976).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c)(1976).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
11. See note 213 infra.
12. E.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098 (N.D. Ga. 1975), affid, 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
13. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
14. A third civil rights action was also involved, alleging discrimination on the basis of
effeminacy. Id. at 328.
15. Id.
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The three plaintiffs also challenged Pacific Telephone & Telegraph's
alleged hiring policy that excluded homosexual persons from employ-
"ment.16 The plaintiffs in the second action were two lesbian operators
alleging discrimination and eventual dismissal because of their known
lesbian relationship. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's decisions, 17 dismissing both of the complaints for failure to
state claims under either statute.18 The court held that gay people are not
protected under Title VII. 19 The section 1985(c) claim was dismissed
because the court decided that homosexuals do not constitute a "class"
20
within that statute's protection.
Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Co.21 was a civil rights action in which plaintiffs claimed that a public
utility's employment practices discriminated against gay people. The
action was brought by individuals and organizations working to promote
equal rights for gay persons. In contrast to DeSantis, this case established
several bases for attacks on private discrimination against gay employees,
at least in California. The Superior Court, sitting in San Francisco, entered
judgment for the employer,22 but the Supreme Court of California
reversed.23 That court held that the complaint stated a cause of action
under the equal protection clause of the California Constitution,24 a
California Public Utilities Code nondiscrimination provision,25 and
California Labor Code provisions protecting employees' right to engage in
political activity.26 The analyses of the courts in both Gay Law Students
and DeSantis concerning the applicability of the theories considered in
those cases will be examined in the sections reviewing each theory.
B. Current Legal Theories that May Offer Remedies
There are existing statutory and common law theories that may offer
protection from discrimination against gay people in private employment.
Any of these theories might provide a remedy for people who have suffered
discrimination in private employment based on their sexual preference.
The sections that follow will examine a number of these theories, which are
grounded in the following areas of law: Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c),
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 329-32.
20. Id. at 332-33.
21. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
22. The court ofappeals affirmed the superior court decision. 65 Cal. App. 3d 608,135 Cal. Rptr.
465 (1977).
23. 24 Cal. 3d 458,595 P.2d 592,156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979) (the court affirmed the decision insofar
as it held that the Fair Employment Practice Act did not encompass the discrimination at issue).
24. Id. at 467-75, 595 P.2d at 597-602, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 19-24.
25. Id. at 475-86, 595 P.2d at 602-09, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 25-31.
26. Id. at 486-89, 595 P.2d at 609-11, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 31-33.
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National Labor Relations Act and labor contracts, tortious dismissals
based on political acts, state and local law, and employers' nondiscrimina-
tion policies.
1. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196427 prohibits discrimination in
private employment based on classification of employees by race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Sexual preference is not one of the
prohibited categories listed in the text of the statute. Courts have
consistently held that sex, within the meaning of the statute, does not
28include sexual preference as an impermissible classification.
Gay rights advocates are struggling to amend Title VII to establish
clear protection of the employment rights of gay people.29 So far, none of
their proposals have been enacted, although an amendment to Title VII
would be the simplest way to protect the rights of gay people in private
employment.
Until an amendment to Title VII does guarantee protection, litigants
will continue to argue whether the present statutory language impliedly
contemplates protection of gay people. Two theories supporting
protection of gay people under Title VII have been suggested. A theory
based on the alleged disparate impact on males resulting from
discrimination against gay persons has been gaining popularity among
commentators in the field of employment discrimination. 30 The second
theory is that sexual preference should be held to be an impermissible
classification because discrimination on the basis of sexual preference
frustrates Congress' intent to protect employees from discrimination based
on irrelevant stereotypes.3'
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). Section 2010e-2(a) provides:
It ihall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would . . . adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Section 2000e-2 sets out similar nondiscrimination requirements with respect to employment agencies,
labor organizations, and training programs, in subsections (b), (c), and (d), respectively.
28. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies
Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975), afld without published opinion, 570 F.2d 354(9th
Cir. 1978). See also note 212 infra.
29. Proposed bills to amend Title VII include: H.R. 2074, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R.
8269, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 8268, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 7775,95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977); H.R. 5239, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); H.R. 4794, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R.
2998, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 451, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5452,94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975); H.R. 2667, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
30. G. COOPER, H. RABB & H. RUBIN, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 297 (1975); Friedman,
Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Discrimination in Employment Based on Sexual
Orientation, 64 IowA L. REV. 527, 561-68 (1979); Siniscalco, Homosexual Discrimination in
Employment, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 495,506-11(1976); Rivera & Galvan, Homosexuals and Title
VII. 3 TEx. S.L. REv. 126, 136-40 (1975).
31. See text accompanying notes 54-72 infra.
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a. The Disparate Impact Theory
In DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,3 2 the plaintiffs
argued that discrimination on the basis of homosexuality has a disparate
impact on males and, therefore, violates Title VII's prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex.3 This argument is based on a United
States Supreme Court interpretation of Title VII set forth in Griggs v.
Duke Power Company,34 in which the Court held that the Act proscribes
not only overt discrimination, but also "practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation. 35 If the discriminatory practice could not be
shown to be "related to job performance," the Court held that the practice
would be prohibited, regardless of the employer's intent.36
The contention that discrimination against gay people has a
disproportionate impact on males rests upon two premises. First, some
social scientists have reported that the incidence of homosexuality is
greater in the male population." Second, through the existence of military
and arrest records that indicate sexual preference, an employer is more
likely to discover the sexual preference of a gay male than that of a
lesbian. 8
In DeSantis, plaintiffs argued that, because of this disparate impact
on males, discrimination against gay people in private employment falls
within the Title VII prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex. The
Ninth Circuit rejected this proposed application of the Griggs disparate
impact theory of discrimination against gay people,39 indicating that the
disparate impact standard should be limited in application to situations
that will effect Congressional objectives.40 A judicial grant of Title VII
protection to gay people would, according to the court, frustrate a
perceived Congressional intent to deny Title VII protection to gay
people.4' Indeed, a number of bills have been introduced in Congress to
add sexual preference to the list of Title VII impermissible classifications,
but none have been enacted.42 This Congressional refusal to amend Title
VII, however, is not necessarily indicative of an intent to prohibitTitle VII
32. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
33. Id. at 329.
34. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
35. Id. at 431.
36. Id. at 431-32.
37. J. GAGNON & W. SIMON, SEXUAL CONDUCT 177 n. 2 (1973); D. J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY 39-
42(1967).
38. Rivera & Galvan, supra note 30, at 136-37; Project, The Consenting Adult Homosexualand
the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 647, 740 (1966). See generally, G. COOPER, H. RABB & H. RUBIN, supra note 30, at 297-98:
39. 608 F.2d 327, 330-31 (9th Cir. 1979).
40. Id. at 330.
41. Id.
42. See note 29 supra.
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protection of gay people. Clearly, one of the objectives of Title VII is to
protect against employment discrimination based upon the sex of an
applicant. The DeSantis court apparently believed that Congress would be
willing to sacrifice this protection to the extent that enforcing Title VII
extended protection to gay people. Judge Sneed, in his concurring and
dissenting opinion in DeSantis, rejected the majority's conclusion that the
plaintiffs' assertion of the Griggs disparate impact theory was an artifice to
bootstrap protection for gay people.43 Judge Sneed felt that if a
disproportionate impact on males could be established, a violation of Title
VII would exist.
44
Even if the disparate impact theory is held to be applicable, there exist
great difficulties of proof. 45 A litigant must establish that the discrimina-
tion against gay employees or applicants has a disproportionate impact on
males as a class. 46 It is not enough that proportionately more gay men than
lesbians suffer.47 A showing of a disproportionate impact on males
probably will have to be made using a population in which gay males are a
large proportion of the total applicable male population.
Illustrating the previous point, it was a lack of proof of a disparate
impact on males that caused dismissal of a sex discrimination claim based
on Griggs' disparate impact standard in Gay Law Students Association v.
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.49 In that case, the California court
questioned Griggs' applicability to males as a class, but went on to hold
that, even assuming Griggs applied, no showing of disparate impact had
been made.50 The court noted that it did not appear that Pacific Telephone
& Telegraph had excluded a significant number of males.5 No statistical
proof was offered to establish the disproportionate impact on males of
discrimination against gay people. Apparently, statistical proof will be
required by the courts to verify a claim of disparate impact.
Beyond the difficulties of proof, there is another serious problem with
applying the disparate impact standard to obtain protection of employ-
ment rights of gay people: it is counterproductive. To avoid disparate
impact liability under Title VII, employers need only be careful to
discriminate equally against lesbians and gay men. While it is true that gay
males generally are more visible due to military and arrest records, 52 the
expanding role of women in the military may alter that situation.
43. 608 F.2d 327, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1979).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 333.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 65 Cal. App. 3d 608, 135 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1977), af/'d in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
50. Id. at 618, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
51. Id.
52. See note 38 supra.
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Moreover, to establish equal treatment sufficient to avoid disparate impact
liability, employers may resort to firing more lesbians than are known to be
employed, by also dismissing those employees suspected of being lesbians.
The woman who possesses traits most commonly associated with male
roles53 will be an obvious choice for discrimination. Though the disparate
impact theory is grounded in a search for protection of gay civil rights,
encouraging harassment of gay women and heterosexual women who
deviate from the cultural female norm is not the way to establish gay
people's rights in private employment. There is a much more positive
theory that would establish gay employment rights through Title VII.
b. Sexual Stereotypes
Discrimination on the basis of sexual preference frustrates Congress'
intent to protect employees from discrimination based on irrelevant
stereotypes. 4 To implement Congressional intent, courts should construe
the term "sex," as used in Title VII, to include sexual preference as an
impermissible classification.5
This Congressional intent to prohibit employment discrimination
based on stereotypes was recognized in Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp.,56 a challenge to Martin Marietta Corporation's policy of not
accepting employment applications from women with preschool-age
children. 7 A majority of the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, held
that all parents with preschool-age children must be subject to the same
hiring policy, unless the existence of a family is "demonstrably more
relevant to job performance for a woman. . . ."58 The Court noted that a
demonstration that the sex of a parent-applicant was relevant to job
performance arguably could be a basis for discriminatory hiring policies,
but held that insufficient evidence had been presented to support a decision
concerning whether specific family obligations of a woman are a bona fide
53. Aggressiveness, ambition, assertiveness, career-orientation, and self-reliance, for example,
are traits generally associated with male roles.
54. For cases holding that discrimination based on sexual preference per se is arbitrary, see Gay
Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458,467,595 P.2d 592,597,156 Cal. Rptr. 14,
19 (1979). The American Law Institute has observed: "This area of private morals is the distinctive
concern of spiritual authorities." Note, Homosexuality and the Law-an Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273,
299 (1971) (footnote omitted). "The American Psychiatric Association stated, during 1973, that
homosexuality is not a personality disorder and recommended that all discrimination against
homosexuals, including employment discrimination, should cease." G. CooPaR, H. RABB & H. RuBIN,
supra note 30, at 277.
55. The theory discussed in this section, based upon Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), was suggested in Rivera, supra note 1, at 807.
56. 400 U.S. 542 (1971). Accord, Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711,717 (7th Cir.
1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1969). The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex provide in
part: "(I) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the application of the
bona fide occupational qualification exception: ... (ii) the refusal to hire an individual based on
stereotyped characterisations of the sexes." 29 C.F.R. § 1601. l(a)(1979).
57. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542-43 (1971).
58. Id. at 544.
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occupational qualification. 9 Justice Marshall disagreed that two hiring
policies, their application dependent on the sex of the applicant, could be
justified. 0 In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall said:
[T]he Court has fallen into the trap of assuming that [Title VII] permits
ancient canards about the proper role of women to be a basis for
discrimination. Congress, however, sought just the opposite result.
• ..Congress intended to prevent employers from refusing to hire an
individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes. . . Even
characterizations of the proper domestic roles of the sexes were not to serve as
predicates for restricting employment opportunity.61
This Congressional objective 62 will be furthered by extending Title VII
protection to gay people.
Certainly a legitimate argument exists that discrimination on the basis
of sexual preference is "based on stereotyped characterizations of the
sexes." 63 The person who displays characteristics stereotypically inap-
propriate to his/her gender, especially the effeminate male, is the most
likely person to be suspected of being gay. The sexual stereotype most
obviously rejected by every gay person is the one dictating that a person's
sexual preference should be solely for persons of the opposite gender. The
most basic reason that lesbians suffer discrimination is that the object of
their sexual attention is of a gender stereotypically inappropriate for a
woman.
In two recent cases, the courts have equated homosexuality with
displaying characteristics stereotypically inappropriate to one's gender. In
1969, an applicant who "displayed characteristics inappropriate to his sex"
was denied ajob in an insurance company mail room. 64 The district court,
in Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,6 5 held that this applicant had no
Title VII claim because Congress had not forbidden discrimination based
on sexual preference.66 The court equated effeminacy in the male applicant
with homosexuality, though the court's opinion cites no evidence that the
applicant was gay. Strailey v. Happy Times Nursery School,67 con-
solidated with DeSantis, involved a teacher who was terminated because
he wore an earring to school before the school year started.68 The Ninth
Circuit said that Title VII does not ban discrimination based on sexual
preference and thus does not ban discrimination based on effeminacy.69 In
59. Id.
60. Id. at 544-47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
62. Id.; see note 56 and accompanying text supra.
63. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring).
64. Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 395 F. Supp. 1098, 1099 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
65. Id. at 1099-1101.
66. Id. at 1101.
67. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
68. Id. at 328. No evidence that Strailey was gay appears in the court's opinion.
69. Id. at 331-32.
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both of these cases, the courts equated homosexuality with males' display
of effeminate characteristics.
A woman's display of masculinity or a man's display of effeminacy is the
most likely cause of discrimination based on suspected homosexuality.
Congress, through Title VII, intended to prohibit discrimination based on
stereotyped ideas of the proper role of a woman or a man.7 ° Justice
Marshall, in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation, recognized that
"characterizations of the proper domestic roles of the sexes" were not
legitimate bases for discrimination.7' Likewise, characterizations of the
proper sexual roles of the sexes are not legitimate bases for discrimination.
Neither domestic nor sexual role is relevant to employment opportunity. 2
Thus, to implement Congressional intent, courts should construe the term
"sex," as used in Title VII, to include sexual preference as an impermissible
classification.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c)
Another possible avenue for legal redress of private employment
discrimination against gay people is 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c).73 Section
1985(c) 74 prohibits any conspiracy to deprive any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the law, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the law, resulting in another's injury, in person or
property, or deprivation of a right or privilege of a United States citizen.
75
Recovery under this section by gay people who are subjected to private
employment discrimination, however, is not assured. Potential obstacles
include satisfaction of the conspiracy requirement, recognition of gay
people as a class protected by the section, and proof of deprivation of a
protected right.
a. Conspiracy
Employment discrimination claims brought under section 1985(c)
usually should allege that a business's employees or agents implement
policies or practices that constitute a prohibited conspiracy. Section
70. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544-47 (1971); see note 56 and
accompanying text supra.
71. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
72. See note 54 supra.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1985()(1976)(formerly § 1985(3)) states in part:
If two or more persons . . . conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws [and] . . . if one or more persons engaged therein
do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of havingand exercisingany right or
privilege of a cititen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action
for the recovery of damages. . ..
74. The statute's predecessor was enacted as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284
(1861).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c)(1976).
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1985(c) claims against corporate defendants have been met with the
argument that officers and directors of a single corporation cannot legally
form a conspiracy, as is required by the statute. The federal circuit courts
disagree on the proper resolution of this issue. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Herrmann v. Moore,7 6 held that concerted action among
corporate employees cannot establish a conspiracy for purposes of section
1985(c). This decision was based on the theory that a corporation, as a legal
person, cannot conspire with itself.77 This corporation/ person theory was
found to be inapposite by the Third Circuit in Novotny v. Great American
Federal Savings & Loan Association,78 in which it was alleged that
individual corporate employees had conspired to discriminate. That court
held that "concerted action among corporate officers and directors [can]
constitute a conspiracy under § [1985(c)], 7 9 expressly declining to follow
Herrmann.'° This position is supported by a series of cases holding that
criminal conspiracies may result from the acts of officers and directors of
one corporation.8' The only directly relevant United States Supreme
Court decision, Pennsylvania Railroad System & Allied Lines Fed. No. 90
v. Pennsylvania Railroad,82 accepted without question the contention that
the acts of corporate officers constituted a conspiracy for purposes of a
conspiracy requirement similar to that of section 1985(c).
Even if a court will not accept the possibility of a conspiracy within the
employing corporation, the existence of a conspiracy may still be
established. Section 1985(c) requires only that "two or more
persons . . . conspire"83 to deprive a person of his/her civil rights.
Therefore, the discriminatory practices of employers in a particular
industry or within a particular geographical area may evidence a
conspiracy to exclude gay people. Conspiracies also may exist in the
discriminatory practices of unions and hiring halls.
76. 576 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1978). Accord, Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976). Accord, Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 505 F.2d 181, 183
(8th Cir. 1974); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972) (limiting holdings to situations
involving "a single act of discrimination by a single business entity").
77. This theory was established in Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola Inc., 200 F.2d 911,
914-15 (5th Cir. 1952).
78. 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979) (42 U.S.C. §
1985(c) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII) action by employee dismissed because of his advocacy of
equal employment opportunity for women).
79. Id. at 1259 (footnote omitted).
80. Id. at 1260.
81. Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943) (conspiracy
to make illegal politicalcontribution); Minnisohn v. United States, 101 F.2d477 (3d Cir. 1939); Barron
v. United States, 5 F.2d 799, 799-801 (Ist Cir. 1925) (conspiracy to conceal assets of bankrupt
corporation); United States v. Kemmel, 160 F. Supp. 718, 720-21 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (conspiracy to
defraud the United States; collecting cases).
82. 267 U.S. 203 (1925). In this case, in which a claim was brought under a predecessor statute to
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976)-which has a similar conspiracy requirement-no doubt was raised regarding
the viability of a conspiracy of officers of one corporation.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c)(1976).
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b. Protected Class
In addition to the existence of a conspiracy, a section 1985(c)
complainant must also establish the existence of "some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action.,8 4 This requirement was established by the United
States Supreme Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 5 partly to avoid the
constitutional issues that would be raised by the establishment of a general
federal tort law.86 The Court also perceived a Congressional intent to limit
section 1985(c)'s remedies to actions motivated by class-based animus.87
Although the conspiracy alleged in Griffin was directed against black
persons, courts construing section 1985(c) have not limited its protection
to racial classifications. The Ninth Circuit, in Life Insurance Co. of North
America v. Reichardt,8" held that women purchasers of disability
insurance constitute a class for purposes of section 1985(c). The court did
not specify the characteristics of a protected class, but did note that gender-
based classifications could result in invidious discrimination89 and that the
class involved in Reichardt was clearly defined. 90 The court also recognized
that the drafters of section 1985(c) intended to protect other groups in
addition to oppressed southern blacks. 91 The Third Circuit, in Novotny v.
Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association,92 also emphasized
the breadth of section 1985(c) protection, holding that the statute
prohibited conspiracies against women. That court declared that
legislators' expectations of the limits of section 1985(c)'s protection would
not restrict the interpretation of contrary statutory language. 93 The court
emphasized the changing nature of community prejudices and the evolving
ideal of equality supported by the statutory language.94 Some of the other
classes that have been held to be protected by section 1985(c) include
political opponents,95 supporters of a political candidate,96 persons
holding a certain political view,97 members of the Jewish faith,98 and
members of a single family. 99 It is clear that section 1985(c) "has been
84. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (§ 1985(c) action alleging conspiracy to de-
prive black persons of their civil rights).
85. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
86. Id. at 102.
87. Id.
88. 591 F.2d 499 (1979).
89. Id. at 505 n. 16.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979).
93. Id. at 1241.
94. Id. at 1241-43.
95. Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
96. Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973).
97. Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971).
98. Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973).
99. Aiar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1972).
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liberated from the now anachronistic historical circumstances of
reconstruction America ... "1oo
Extension of the scope of section 1985(c) to include protection of the
civil rights of gay people may clearly be supported by the relevant case law.
Those who conspire to deprive gay people of their civil rights are acting on
a class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. It is true that a definition
of who will be included in the class of gay people is difficult to articulate.
There are no clear objective criteria, the existence of which establish one's
homosexuality.'° On a continuum of sexual preference, most Americans
fall somewhere between exclusive heterosexuality and exclusive homosex-
uality.10 2 One person might be labeled gay at one point in his/her life and
heterosexual at another.10 3 Regardless of the definition used, once a person
is labeled as gay, discrimination against the person on that basis is class-
based discrimination.
Nevertheless, in DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., the
Ninth Circuit refused to recognize section 1985(c) protection for gay
people's civil rights because the court perceived no other special federal
protection of the rights of gay people. 04 That court would grant section
1985(c) protection to groups that require and warrant special federal
protection.'0 5 Such a limitation on the coverage of section 1985(c) might be
reasonable.l16 The Ninth Circuit, however, did not analyze the needs of gay
people or the justifications for protecting the rights of gay people. Instead,
the court further limited section 1985(c) protection-indicating that unless
a group already had been granted special federal protection, it would not
qualify as a class for purposes of section 1985(c).' 0 7 Other groups that
enjoy no other special federal protection but have been granted section
1985(c) protection include political opponents, 08 supporters of a political
candidate,'0 9 people with a certain political view,"0 and members of a
single family. " The DeSantis court did not discuss recognition of these
other classes, so it is not clear if the Ninth Circuit would not recognize
100. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979).
101. Dunlap, supra note 1.
102. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, supra note 1,at 638-43; A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C.
MARTIN & P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 469-74 (1953).
103. Reportedly, many men have homosexual experiences before the age of twenty that are not
repeated later in life. J. GAGNON & W. SIMON, supra note 37, at 131. See Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (married father who engaged in same-sex behavior in late teens labeled and treated as
homosexual).
104. 608 F.2d 327, 333 (1979).
105. Id.
106. In fact, gay people have been considered to be a group that requires and warrants special
federal protection. See text accompanying notes 112-118 infra.
107. Id.
108. Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
109. Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973).
110. Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971).
111. Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1972).
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protection of these classes or if, for some reason, a different standard was
applied to gay people." 2
The DeSantis court offered two examples of evidence of special
federal protection that might qualify a class for section 1985(c)
protection.1 3 The first is inclusion within the enumerated protected classes
of Title VII.114 This is not a particularly useful standard. A recent Supreme
Court decision has held that deprivation of a right created by Title VII
cannot be remedied through a section 1985(c) claim.115 Therefore, if Title
VII protection is required to establish existence of a section 1985(c)
protected class, section 1985(c) will be rendered virtually worthless for
employment discrimination purposes.
The second example of evidence of special federal protection is
designation by the courts as a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" classification
for purposes of fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis.
16
Generally, a state's classification of individuals for differing treatment
must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest to survive
constitutional scrutiny. 17 If differing treatment is based on a quasi-suspect
classification, such as sex, the classification must have a fair and
substantial relationship to an important government interest to be
upheld." 8 If a suspect classification is involved, the classification must be
necessary to promote a compelling state interest. 119
No court has yet held that sexual preference is a quasi-suspect or
suspect classification. Persuasive arguments exist, however, for the
inclusion of sexual preference as at least a quasi-suspect basis for
classification. The characteristics of a suspect class traditionally include
being "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.' 120 In this case, the lack of explicit statutory
protection of the civil rights of gay people is evidence that gay people are
politically powerless. If gay people had power, they would establish
112. Sneed, J., concurring and dissenting in DeSantis, was persuaded that gay people were not
protected by § 1985(c) by Congress' specific refusal to prohibit discrimination against gay people. 608
F.2d at 334 n. I. Though many bills protecting gay people have been proposed, see note 29 supra, none
have been enacted. This is not necessarily indicative of a general Congressional intent to deny
protection for gay people, however, since it may simply be political inexpedience that keeps members
of Congress from voting in favor of protection of this oppressed minority.
113. 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979).
114. Id.
115. Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979).
116. 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979).
117. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Goeseart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464(1948).
118. A quasi-suspect classification is a classification to which the intermediate test is applied.
Gender is one example of a quasi-suspect classification. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
119. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
120. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
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statutory protection for themselves. 121 Gay people also have been subject
to a history of purposeful unequal treatment. 22 Two additional
characteristics that distinguish a suspect or quasi-suspect status from
nonsuspect statuses are immutability of characteristics and the fact that
the status "frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute
to society." 123 Psychologists and psychiatrists increasingly are asserting
that homosexuality is an immutable1 24 characteristic.1 25 Homosexuality
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society. 126 One psychologist reports that "most people who are involved in
homosexuality . . . are sufficiently integrated into the mainstream of
everyday life to comfortably fit in ... 27 Since classifications based on
sexual preference are marked by those characteristics that distinguish a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, the absence of recognition as a suspect class
is not a persuasive ground for distinguishing gay people from suspect or
quasi-suspect classes that receive section 1985(c) protection.
Even if one accepts the DeSantis majority requirement of other
special federal protection, the requirement does not exclude gay people as
a protected class. It appears that there presently exists at least minimal
federal protection of the employment rights of gay people. First, the Civil
Service Regulations' guidelines establish special protection from arbitrary
discrimination against gay people in federal employment.1 28 Another
example of special federal protection is in the recognition of gay persons'
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.129 Federal courts are in agreement that
121. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
122. D. ALTMAN, HOMOSEXUAL OPPRESSION AND LIBERATION 42-69 (1971); Barrett, Legal
Homophobia and the Christian Church, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 1019, 1020-25 (1979).
123. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted);
Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1243 (3d cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979).
124. immutable is defined to be: "not capable or susceptible of change" WEBSTER'S, supra note 1,
at 1131.
125. "[T]he Kinsey Research made a concerted effort over a period of years to find and evaluate
the histories of people whose [sexual preference] had changed either during or following therapy ofany
kind. None was ever found." C. TRIPP, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX 236-38 (1975). For a general review
of the literature on the subject, see D. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED 241-75 (1977).
126. See Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., I Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969)
(homosexuality itself is not evidence of unfitness to teach); Civil Service Regulations, supra note 112;
A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, supra note 1, at 141-48. Further evidence can be found in the number of
private employers with nondiscrimination policies. See text accompanying notes 226-31 supra.
127. C. TRIPP, supra note 131, at 140.
128. The "Suitability Guidelines for Federal Employment" for determining "Infamous or
Notoriously Disgraceful Conduct" provide in part:
Court decisions require that persons not be disqualified from Federal employment solely on
the basis of homosexual conduct. The Commission and agencies have been enjoined not to
find a person unsuitable for Federal employment solely because that person is homosexual or
has engaged in homosexual acts. Based upon these court decisions and outstanding
injunction, while a person may not be found unsuitable based on unsubstantiated conclusions
concerning possible embarrassment to the Federal service, a person may be dismissed or
found unsuitable for Federal employment where the evidence establishes that such person's
sexual conduct affects job fitness.
Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 255 n. 15 (9th cir. 1976), vacated, 429 U.S.
1034 (1977) (citing 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(b) (1979)).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The statute provides:
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section 1983 protects against deprivation of a gay person's civil rights
under color of state law. In McConnell v. Anderson,130 a section 1983 suit
brought by a gay male librarian denied public employment because of his
sexual preference, the court held that to reject an applicant for public
employment, one must show an observable and reasonable relationship
between efficiency on the job and homosexuality. 131
The predecessors of both section 1983 and section 1985(c) were
included in the Ku Klux Klan Act when enacted.132 Since Congress
considered the sections at the same time, and they werejoined in one act, it
seems likely that the intended scope of protection was the same for both.
Thus, the protections afforded by section 1983 are relevant to a
determination of the scope of section 1985(c). The Third Circuit in
Novotny 33 noted that the acceptance of section 1983 claims of discrimi-
nation lends weight to an argument that section 1985(c) protection should
be recognized, because of the joint enactment of their predecessor
statutes.134 The DeSantis court does not mention these protections, so it is
not known whether they were rejected as unacceptable evidence of special
federal protection or simply not considered.
c. Protected Rights
Even if section 1985(c) protection is expanded to gay people, a final
obstacle may prevent a section 1985(c) remedy in cases of private
employment discrimination. The person who has suffered discrimination
must have been deprived of a right that is afforded protection by section
1985(c). The federal courts of appeals are split on the issue of which rights
are protected from deprivation by section 1985(c). Judicial interpretation
of the statutory language, "equal protection of the laws, or . . equal
privileges and immunities under the laws,"'135 is complicated by the often
unspoken issue of which rights Congress has the constitutional power to
protect.
Every person who, under color ofany statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 may provide a remedy for discrimination in private employment, if state action can
be established. Factors that support a finding of state action are: (1) entanglement between public and
private entities, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); (2) performance of a
"public function", Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); (3) public financial support, Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); (4) legal support or encouragement of private action, Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In more recent decisions, the Supreme Court has refused to find state
action in relatively private entities. E.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (liquor licensing
does not establish state action); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (utility
monopoly regulated by public commission does not constitute state action).
130. 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
131. Id. at 814.
132. Ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284 (1861).
133. 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 99 S.Ct. 2345 (1979).
134. Id. at 1242 n.26.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (c)(1976).
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In Griffin v. Breckenridge,13 6 the United States Supreme Court held
that section 1985(c) protects the right to equal protection of the laws and
the right to interstate travel, and prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race.137 The courts of appeals are in accord on the scope of section 1985(c)'s
application to racial discrimination and interstate travel,'38 but their
interpretations of the provision's application to equal protection of the
laws have varied widely.
There exists considerable disagreement whether section 1985(c)
creates substantive rights or only provides remedies for the deprivation of
existing rights. 139 At one extreme, the Eighth Circuit, in Action v.
Gannon, 14 held that section 1985(c) extended the right to equal treatment
by the states, guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, to a right to equal
treatment by private persons. At the opposite extreme, the Fifth Circuit, in
McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co.,14 ' held that the object of a
conspiracy must be independently illegal before section 1985(c) can protect
against that conspiracy. Most courts hold that section 1985(c) protects
against the deprivation of legally protected rights, the sources of which are
outside the Act. 142
There is further disagreement whether the source of the rights
protected by section 1985(c) include federal constitution, federal statutes,
and perhaps even state law. In Novotny v. Great American Federal
Savings & Loan Association, 14 the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court expressed differing opinions on this issue. Justice Powell would
limit the scope of the "equal protection" language of section 1985(c) to
protection of fundamental constitutional rights.144 Justice Stevens would
protect only constitutional rights, including the general fourteenth
amendment right to receive equal treatment from the state. 45 The majority
in Novotny and the three dissenting Justices would generally extend the
scope of section 1985(c)'s "equal protection" language to protect federal
statutory as well as constitutional rights. 146 The Ninth Circuit, in Life
Insurance Co. of North America v. Reichardt,147 has gone even further,
136. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
137. Id. at 97.
138. E.g., Life Ins. Co. of N. America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499,503 (9th Cir. 1979); Cohen v.
Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818,828-29 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,425 U.S. 943 (1976), aff'd
as amended, 581 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1978).
139. Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235,1246-48 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds, 99 S.Ct. 2345 (1979).
140. 450 F.2d 1227, 1234-35 (8th Cir. 1971).
141. 545 F.2d 919, 924-28 (5th Cir. 1977)(en banc).
142. E.g., Life Ins. Co. ofN. Americav. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499,503 (9th Cir. 1979);Novotnyv.
Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1247-51 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 99
S.Ct. 2345 (1979).
143. 99 S.Ct. 2345 (1979).
144. Id. at 2352-53.
145. Id. at 2353-55.
146. Id. at 2349-52, 2356-58.
147. 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979).
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holding that violations of state-conferred rights and privileges offend the
statute. 48 The court declared that limiting section 1985(c)'s prohibitions to
the deprivation of federal rights is contrary to the purpose of the statute,
and contrary to Supreme Court interpretation. 49 The Ninth Circuit
indicated that only the motivation element of a section 1985(c) offense
prevents the statute from creating a general federal tort law.
50
One of the reasons that courts are reluctant to extend the scope of the
rights protected by section 1985(c) is that Congress' power to prohibit
private conspiracies is unclear. There are four possible sources of
Congressional power to reach private conspiracies. The first two are the
thirteenth amendment' 5' and the right to interstate travel. 52 Neither of
these sources is likely to be held to incorporate power to reach
discrimination against gay people in private employment.1 53 The third
source of power is the commerce clause.' 54 Congress has the power to'
prohibit certain actions which have a cumulative detrimental effect on
interstate commerce.'55 Conspiracies against the civil rights of black
persons have been held, in Katzenbach v. McClung,156 to discourage
interstate relocation of business because they cause black people to feel
unwelcome. Congress has the power, based on any of these three sources of
power, to reach private action. The fourth potential source of power to
reach private conspiracies is section five of the fourteenth amendment.
157
In United States v. Guest,158 the United States Supreme Court indicated
that Congress could prohibit private interference with fourteenth
amendment rights. It remains unclear whether that power is limited to
prohibiting private interference with the state's performance of its duties,
or whether it would reach direct private interference with a person's civil
rights. 59 The Fourth Circuit, in Doski v. Goldseker, 60 held that although
148. Id. at 505.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 505 n.14.
151. "Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States. . . . Section 2.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
152. Crandall v. Nevada, 74 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
153. However, a court could hold that any invidious discrimination was a "badge ofslavery"and
therefore prohibited by the thirteenth amendment. Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer & Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968)(racial discrimination in housing was a badge of slavery).
154. "[The Congress shall have power] [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;" U.S. Co NsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
155. Kattenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)(power to prohibit racial discrimination in
restaurant that discouraged interstate relocation of business).
156. Id.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
158. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
159. Compare Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818,828-29 (7th Cir. 1975), affd
on reh. en bane, 581 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1978), with Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1235 (8th Cir.
1971)(en banc).
160. 539 F.2d 1326 (1976).
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Congress has the power to prohibit private interference with fourteenth
amendment rights, it did not intend to do so by enacting section 1985(c).
This holding seems disingenuous, however, since the predecessors of 42
U.S.C. § 1983-which expressly is limited by a state action
requirement 16'-and section 1985(c)-which is not so limited-were
enacted as part of the same statute.1 62 It appears that, had Congress
intended section 1985(c) to reach only state action, it would have included
in that section an explicit state action requirement similar to that found in
section 1983. This not being the case, it seems safe to conclude that
Congress did not intend section 1985(c) to provide a remedy only forthose
instances that qualify as state action; rather, Congress' limitation on the
application of section 1985(c) to private action was the conspiracy
requirement. 163 Under this interpretation of section 1985(c), the provision
can serve as the basis for a claim for relief from concerted private action to
interfere with rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
Even though the Doski rationale can be attacked on the above-stated
grounds, the present state of the law, exemplified by Doski, indicates that
section 1985(c) does not reach private interference with fourteenth
amendment rights-either because Congress is not empowered to grant
such relief, or because it did not intend section 1985(c) to reach these
matters. If this interpretation of section 1985(c) is accurate, then a claimant
under the provision will have to establish a violation of a right guaranteed
by the thirteenth amendment, a violation of the right to interstate travel,
denial of a fourteenth amendment right by state action, or contravention
of a commerce clause policy.
The gay complainant who has alleged discrimination in private
employment may have to explore the issue of the scope of the rights
protected by section 1985(c). First, Congress must have intended to protect
the type of right alleged to have been infringed. If Congress intended to
prohibit that deprivation, then the court must determine if Congress had
the power to do so. Although private employment rights are not protected
under all interpretations of the statute, the litigant, as has previously been
shown, has a solid base from which to argue that protection should be
granted.
3. National Labor Relations Act and Labor Contracts
Gay union members may find protection under several provisions of
the National Labor Relations Act.164 The Act has been interpreted to
require that unions fairly represent all members. 165 Furthermore,
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). ("under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory .... ")
163. Life Ins. Co. of N. America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 505 n.14 (9th Cir. 1979).
164. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). (This interpretation was suggested in Kovarsky, Fair
Employmentfor the Homosexual, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 527, 560-65.
165. E.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
[Vol. 41:501
SEXUAL PREFERENCE
employers are not allowed, under the Act, to interfere with union
activities. 66 Most union contracts provide that just cause must be
established to justify dismissals. 167 This section will consider the
applicability and usefulness of each of these requirements to protect the
employment rights of gay people.
The union's duty of fair representation is an affirmative duty to
represent each employee on an equal basis. 168 Under this doctrine, an
"6exclusive agent's statutory authority to represent all members of a
designated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all
members without hostility or discrimination towards any, to exercise its
discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary
conduct."'169 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), in Miranda
Fuel Co., 70 held that the duty of fair representation also prohibits a union
from "taking action against any employee upon considerations or
classifications which are irrelevant, invidious or unfair." 17' A breach of this
duty establishes a cause of action not only against the union, but also
against an employer who participates in the discriminatory action. 172 Since
the duty of fair representation is not limited to the protection of specific
categories of employees, it provides a method of reaching actions that are
not prohibited by other, more specific, statutes.
173
Therefore, gay people in a collective bargaining unit represented by an
exclusive statutory agent must have their interests represented by that
agent in good faith. Any union action taken against the gay employee on
the basis of sexual preference would be based on an irrelevant, invidious,
or unfair classification. "74 Moreover, when an employer participates or
acquiesces in the discriminatory action of the union, a gay employee may
seek relief from the employer as well as the union.
The National Labor Relations Act prohibits an employer from
interfering with union activities. 175 The possibility is increasing that union
members will attempt to protect the rights of gay employees. The struggle
to achieve protection of gay people's civil rights is slowly gaining
acceptance as a civil rights movement comparable to the struggles of black
166. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157158 (1976).
167. Kovarsky, supra note 163, at 561.
168. G. COOPER, H. RABB & H. RUBIN, supra note 30, at 44.
169. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 177.
170. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
171. Id. at 185.
172. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 178.
173. G. COOPER, H. RABB & H. RUBIN, supra note 30, at 46. Lundin v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
consolidated with DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. &Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327(9th Cir. 1979), presented a claim of
failure adequately to represent lesbians' interests. The issue was not addressed in the Ninth Circuit
opinion.
174. For cases holding classifications on the basis of homosexuality arbitrary, see Gay Law
Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458,467,595 P.2d 592,597, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 19
(1979).
175. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1976).
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people and women. 176 In particular, a union with a substantial minority of
gay members may seek fair treatment of gay employees. If the rights of gay
employees are a "valid object for employee action," an employer could be
liable for any interference with activities designed to achieve that object.1 77
Alleviation of an employer's invidious discrimination based on race or
national origin has been held to be a valid object, because that
discrimination "inhibits its victims from asserting themselves against their
employer to improve their lot.' 78 Discrimination on the basis of sexual
preference has the same prohibited effect as discrimination on the basis of
race. Sexual preference discrimination inhibits gay employees from taking
action to improve their employment situation because they fear reprisals
based on their sexual preference. Action to protect gay employees,
therefore, should be considered a valid object for employee action, and an
employer should be liable for interference with union activities pursuant to
that object.
Possibly more useful than statutory guarantees is the usual provision
in union contracts that requires just cause to be shown for dismissal of a
union member.179 Arbitration is normally specified as the means for
resolving disputes over the existence of just cause. Typical of language in
arbitration opinions concerning the legitimacy of dismissals based on off-
duty conduct is: "Arbitrators are reluctant to sustain discharges based on
off-duty conduct of employees unless a direct relationship between off-
duty conduct and employment is proved. Discretion must be exercised, lest
Employers become censors of community morals." 180 Arbitrators have
held that even criminal convictions do not create just cause for dismissal
unless such a direct nexus between employment and the extrinsic conduct
exists.181 This standard is illustrated by Babcock & Wilcox Co. 182 which
involved a laborer who was discharged after pleading guilty to charges of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor and spending two months in
176. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. PacificTel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458,487-88,595 P.2d 592,6 10-
11, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 32-33 (1979).
177. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1976). See also United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d
1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
178. United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 903 (1969). This holding has not been followed by the NLRB. In Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B.
272 (1973), enforcedper curiam, 87 L.R.R.M. 3168, 75 Lab. Cas. 10405 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the Board
held that discrimination per se does not violate the Labor Act; instead, there must be a connection
between the discrimination and interference with rights protected by the Labor Act.
179. Kovarsky, supra note 163, at 561.
180. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 38 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 891, 893 (1961)(Duff, Arb.).
Accord, Meniie Dairy Co., 45 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 283,288-89 (1965)(Mullin, Arb.); Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 43 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 242, 244 (1964) (Duff, Arb.); Consolidated Badger Coop., 36
Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 965, 967 (1961) (Mueller, Arb.).
181. E.g., Movielab, Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 632(1968) (McMahon, Arb.) (employee
convicted of possession of narcotics and giving narcotics to a minor); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 43 Lab.
Arb. & Disp. Settl. 242 (1964) (Duff, Arb.) (employee pleaded guilty to charges of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor); Lamb Glass Co., 32 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 420 (1959) (Dworkin. Arb.)
(employee convicted of drunken driving).
182. 43 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 242 (1964)(Duff, Arb.).
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prison. The arbitrator reinstated the employee, noting the lack of a direct
relationship between the off-duty conduct and the employment
relationship. 183 He explained: "Management has no authority to punish
every act of immoral conduct in the community, merely because an
employee is involved."'
84
There seems to be no general standard for establishing a direct
relationship between off-duty conduct and the employment relationship.
Each case is decided on its own facts, usually considering factors affecting
the productivity of the business,'85 safety, 86 and the reputation of the
business. 87 Widespread publicity is often controlling when damage to the
reputation of the business is alleged, or when the possibility of a strike or
economic boycott exists. 88
Some contractual provisions specify violation of the morality of the
community as cause for dismissal. 8 9 At least one arbitrator has held that
these provisions should be held to establish the violation of statutes or
ordinances as the test of immorality.190
If an employee's duties include contact with the public, arbitrators
have been more likely to find off-duty conduct adequate cause for
dismissal.' 9' Public opinion, however, should not be a basis for
employment discrimination. In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc.,192 a Title VII case challenging sex discrimination in hiring flight cabin
attendants, the Fifth Circuit held that "it would be totally anomalous if we
183. Id. at 244.
184. Id.
185. E.g., Baltimore Transit Co., 47 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 62 (1966)(Duff, Arb.)(bus driver
vocal and public Ku Klux Klan leader-danger of economic boycott); Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.,
31 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 775 (1958) (Shaw, Arb.) (employee convicted of grand theftin connection
with aid from local welfare commission: reinstated).
186. E.g., Gas Service Co., 39 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1025 (1962) (Granoff, Arb.) (installation
and service employee who associated with persons of low moral character and had bad reputation held
potentially unsafe); Chicago PneumaticTool Co., 38 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 891 (1961) (Duff, Arb.)
(potential degeneration of cocaine addict possible industrial hazard).
187. E.g., Movielab, Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 632 (1968) (McMahon, Arb.) (employee
convicted of narcotics violations reinstated-no evidence of adverse effect on reputation); Owens-
Illinois Glass Co., 38 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1003 (1962) (Duncan, Arb.) (employee arrested for
bootlegging and grand larceny. Discharge justified, since reflected adversely on company); Mansfield
Tire & Rubber Co., 31 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 775 (1958) (Shaw, Arb.) (employees conviction of
grand theft in connection with aid from local welfare commission did not damage name of company).
188. E.g., Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 38 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1003 (1962) (Duncan, Arb.)
(publicity of employee's arrests reflected adversely on coworkers and company); Baltimore Transit
Co., 47 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 62 (1966) (Duff, Arb.) (discharge of vocal and public Ku Klux Klan
leader approved in face of potential wildcat strike and economic boycott by patrons).
189. E.g., Memphis Publishing Co., 48 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 931 (1967) (Cantor, Arb.)
190. Id. at 933.
191. E.g., Baltimore Transit Co., 47 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 62 (1966) (Duff, Arb.) (bus driver
vocal and public Ku Klux Klan leader); Men/ie Dairy Co., 45 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 283 (1965)
(Mullin, Arb.) (driver-salesman charged with pandering and obscene exhibition); Gas Service Co., 39
Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 1025 (1962) (Granoff, Arb.) (installation and service employee who associated
with persons of low moral character and had bad reputation); Consolidated Badger Coop., 36 Lab.
Arb. & Disp. Settl. 965 (1961) (Mueller, Arb.) (driver-salesman convicted of fornication).
192. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
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were to allow the preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine
whether the sex discrimination was valid."'1 93 In one case at least, though
the arbitrator did find that "reinstating [a driver-salesman convicted of
fornication] . . . would definitely have an adverse effect upon the
consuming public," he recommended that the employer give serious
consideration to recalling the employee for an insidejob. 194 A complainant
certainly could not count on such a recommendation, nor is it binding on
the employer. This action, however, does evidence a genuine attempt fairly
to resolve a dispute, and indicates sympathy with the position of the
employee. Both of these attributes are characteristic advantages that
arbitration offers to the employee in the midst of a dispute with
management.
Clauses in union contracts requiring just cause for dismissal may,
therefore, protect gay employees from dismissal on the grounds of their
homosexuality. Employers would be forced to show that the employee's
homosexuality had a direct relationship to the employment to justify a
dismissal based on that homosexuality. Homosexual acts between
consenting adults in private can never be directly related to the
employment relationship if the employee-actor has no contact with the
public, unless there is widespread publicity.195 Even under contracts with
community morality provisions, gay employees in states that do not
prohibit private consensual homosexual acts between adults should be
protected against dismissal for these acts.
Since sexual preference usually is not related to employment, and
therefore does not constitute just cause for dismissal, an employer may be
denied even the opportunity to receive responses from the employee
concerning his/her sexual preference. At least one arbitrator has held;
"[T]o attempt to force [an employee], through a disciplinary suspension,
to reveal facts about her family and her private life which did not concern
the Company, her job, or her performance of it, was not proper and will
not be upheld."'
196
4. Dismissal on the Basis of Political Acts is Tortious
A thought-provoking theory concerning employee dismissal cases
would modify the traditional "employment at will" rule1 97 with the
recognition of a new common-law tort that would supply a remedy for
193. Id. at 389.
194. Consolidated Badger Coop., 36 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 965, 968 (1961) (Mueller, Arb.).
195. Ifa discharge is based on publicity ofan employee's statements, first amendment free speech
issues may arise. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,419 U.S. 836 (1974)
(gay teacher's transfer approved, though public statements held to be constitutionally protected).
196. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 59 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 134, 140 (1972) (Seward, Arb.).
197. One example of the application of the common law rule is a case holding that an employer
may dismiss employees at will "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without
being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Payne v. Western & A. R. R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
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employees who are discharged because of their political beliefs.'98 The
remedy is most clearly appropriate when the employer did not act to
advance normal business interests, when a large business is involved, and
when the employee did not hold a position in which personal political
feelings might be significant.' 99 A general abusive-discharge doctrine has
been established in at least nine jurisdictions, under which employers have
been found liable for dismissing employees for reasons offensive to public
policy.200 A common-law tort principle that recognizes a cause of action in
any intentional infliction of harm without justification is the source of this
remedy.20 1 Common-law tradition, which would adapt law to produce
common sense justice, supports recognition of such an exception to the
absolute "employment at will" rule.
202
This theory provides a just remedy for advocates of the rights of gay
persons who are discharged for no reason except that advocacy.
McConnell v. Anderson exemplifies such a situation in which a tort
remedy would be appropriate.2 3 McConnell attempted to marry another
man at the same time that he was waiting for approval of his appointment
to a university librarian position. The Board of Regents rejected McCon-
nell's appointment after the attempted marriage drew extensive publicity.
The district court held that the denial of the appointment was unjusti-
fied,20 4 but the Eighth Circuit reversed on appeal.205 The appellate court
said that McConnell was demanding the "right to pursue an activist role in
implementing his unconventional ideas concerning the societal status to be
accorded homosexuals and, thereby, to foist tacit approval of the socially
repugnant concept upon his employer. 20 6 The court distinguished the case
in which a person only wanted to "clandestinely . . . pursue homosexual
conduct. ' '20 7 McConnell's homosexuality was not the basis for denial of
the job-it was his political advocacy of the right of gay people to marry
that cost him his job. A gay person's decision to be open about his/her
198. Krinsky, Chin v. American Telephone & Telegraph: Appellate Brief against Firing for
Political Action, 36 THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD PRACTITIONER 80 (1979).
199. Id. at 85.
200. Id. at 86; Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,344 P.2d25
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977);
Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 111. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (Il1. App. Ct. 1977); Frampton v.
Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249,297 N.E.2d425 (1973); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811
(Ky. App. 1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130,316 A.2d 549 (1974); Walsh v. Consoli-
dated Freightways, Inc., 278 Or. 347, 563 P.2d 1205 (1977); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456
Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
201. Id. at 89.
202. Id. at 90-91.
203. 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
204. 316 F. Supp. 809 (D. Minn. 1970), rev'd, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
205. 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
206. Id. at 196 (emphasis in original).
207. Id.
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homosexuality is often a political act considered to be essential to the
achievement of recognition of the rights of gay people.2 °8
It is fairly clear that political activity is encouraged by society. The
legitimate nature of gay rights advocacy as a political activity has been
recognized for purposes of grants of tax-exempt status to corporations,0 9
and grants of university privileges to gay rights groups. 210 An absolute
"employment at will" rule is not consistent with an economic reality
wherein an employee cannot as easily find another job as an employer can
find another worker. 1' In Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,21 2 the California Supreme Court recognized
advocacy of gay rights as a political activity that would be protected from
interference by the California Labor Code. Employers should not be
allowed to punish gay activists for their efforts to achieve protection for
their civil rights-society encourages such political activity and, thus,
should protect the rights of those who participate in it.
5. State and Local Law
No state statutes or regulations exist that specifically protect the rights
of gay people in private employment. There are a number of municipal and
county ordinances, however, that prohibit discrimination in private213
employment based on sexual preference. These ordinances have been in
existence only a short time,214 so it is difficult to determine their effect.
Widespread knowledge of the existence of these laws is essential to changes
in employment practices and achievement of gay employees' remedies.
208. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. PacificTel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458,486-89,595 P.2d 592,609-
11, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 31-33 (1979).
209. "The Internal Revenue Service has reversed its policy of denying charitable tax exempt
status, under section 50 l(c)(3) of the tax code, to otherwise eligible organizations that take the position
that homosexuality is an acceptable, alternative life style, rather than a 'sickness, disturbance, or
diseased pathology.'" IT's TiME, newsletter ofNGTF, Oct. 1977, at I. The Internal Revenue Service has
not issued a formal regulation. Apparently, each request is handled in the national office on a case-by-
case basis. Rivera, supra note I, at 912-13.
210. E.g., Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080
(1978) (university could not refuse to recognize homosexual student organization); Gay Alliance of
Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976) (court ordered university to recognize homosexual
student organization as registered student organization).
211. Krinsky, supra note 197, at 88.
212. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 486-89, 595 P.2d 592, 609-11, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 31-33 (1979).
213. Anchorage,awska, Ordinance A077-75 (Jan. 20, 1976); ANN ARBOR, MICH., CODE ch. 112,
§§ 9:151-9:155 (1972); DETROIT, MICH., CODE ch. 10, §§ 7-1004-7-1005 (1976); EAST LANSING, MICH.,
CODE ch. 4 § 1.127 (1973); MADISON, WIS., CODE § 323(7) (a) (1976); MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE ch.
945 (1975); PALO ALTO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 2.22.050 (1969); Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 102,562
(Sept. 18, 1973); Washington, D.C., Human Rights Law (Nov. 16, 1973). Alfred, N.Y.; Austin, Tex.;
Berkeley, Cal.; Cleveland Heights, Ohio; Marshall, Minn.; Portland, Ore.; San Jose, Cal.; kson, Ariz.;
Yellow Springs, Ohio. Reported by IT'S TIME, the newsletter of NGTF, March, 1977. Santa Cruz
County, Cal.; Latah bcounty, Idaho; Howard County, Md.; Hennepin County, Minn. Reported by
IT'S TIME, March, 1977. San Francisco, Cal., see NGTF Action Report 3 (May 1978); Aspen, Colo..see
The Advocate, Jan. 25, 1977, at 8; Champaign, Ill., see The Advocate, Sept. 9, 1977, at 8; Iowa bcity,
Iowa, see The Advocate, Feb. 8, 1978, at 11.
214. Almost all have been in existence significantly less than ten years. Rivera, supra note I. at
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Even if a gay employee is not protected by a statute or ordinance
explicitly prohibiting discrimination against gay people, that employee
may have remedies for discrimination based on other state law. The most
encouraging recent case concerning the rights of the privately employed
gay person is a state case, Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 215 in which the California Supreme Court
held that a state-protected "public utility bears a [state] constitutional
obligation to avoid arbitrary employment discrimination," based on the
equal protection clause of the California Constitution.216 The court also
held that the California "Public Utilities Code bars a public utility from
arbitrarily discriminating in its employment practices." 217 A cause of
action may be stated under either of these two prohibitions by alleging
arbitrary discrimination against gay persons.2 18 The court additionally
found that discrimination against openly gay persons or against gay rights
advocates is a violation of the California Labor Code provisions
219
prohibiting employers' interference with employees' political activities.2 2 °
A cause of action may be stated under the Labor Code by alleging
particular discrimination against "persons who identify themselves as
homosexual, who defend homosexuality, or who are identified with
activist homosexual organizations., 221 The California Supreme Court
said: "[T]he struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights,
particularly in the field of employment, must be recognized as a political
activity., 222 The court emphasized the political importance of openly
acknowledging one's homosexuality and associating with other gay people
to work for equal rights.223
The court also indicated that, in California, any organization that has
formed a monopoly of the job opportunities in a particular field may not
arbitrarily exclude individuals.224 This conclusion was based on common-
215. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979).
216. Id. at 467-75, 595 P.2d at 597-602, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 19-24. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 7(a)
provides, in pertinent part: "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law or denied equal protection of the laws; .... "
217. 24 Cal. 3d at 475-86, 595 P.2d at 602-09, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 25-31. CAL. PUBLIC UTILITIES
CODE § 453(a)(1975) provides: "No public utility shall as to rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any
other respect, make or grant any preference or advantage to any corporation or person or subject any
corporation or person to any prejudice or disadvantage."
218. Id. at 475, 486, 595 P.2d at 602, 609, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 24, 31.
219. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1101 (West 1971) provides: "No employer shallmake, adopt, or enforce
any rule. regulation, or policy: (a) Forbidding or preventing employees from engaging or participating
in politics. . . (b) Controlling or directing, or tending to control or direct the political activities or
affiliations of employees." CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102 (West 1971) provides: "No employer shall coerce or
influence or attempt to coerce or influence his employees through orby means of threat of discharge or
loss of employment to adopt or follow or refrain from adopting or following any particular course or
line of political action or political activity."
220. 24 Cal. 3d at 486-89, 595 P.2d at 609-11, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 31-33.
221. Id. at 488, 595 P. 2d at 611, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
222. Id. at 487-88, 595 P.2d at 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
223. Id. at 488, 595 P.2d at 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 32-33.
224. Id. at 482-83, 595 P.2d at 606-07, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
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law principles recognizing monopolistic organizations as holding a"quasi-
public position" and having corresponding obligations.225 Recognized
monopolies include labor unions, professional and business associations,
and public and private hospitals.226 Though these particular prohibitions
apply only in California, Gay Law Students illustrates the potential
usefulness of examining all state protections of civil rights-especially
state labor codes, statutes controlling regulated industries, and any fair
employment statutes-to determine their applicability to the rights of gay
persons.
6. Employers' Nondiscrimination Policies
The National Gay Task Force (NGTF)227 has solicited policy
statements on the employment of gay people from many employers in the
United States. A great number of these employers have responded by
enunciating nondiscrimination policies with respect to hiring and
228promotion. These nondiscriminating employers include American
Telephone and Telegraph (ATT), International Business Machines (IBM),
Citibank, American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Columbia Broad-
casting System (CBS), National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), Bank
of America, Procter & Gamble, Avon Products, and Eastern Airlines.229
These employers are to be commended for their refusal to tolerate
arbitrary. discrimination against gay people. As a result of their
employment policies, these employers will benefit through improved
emotional health of gay employees and an expansion of their applicant
pool.2
30
A gay employee who does suffer discrimination, despite these
assurances of nondiscrimination, will probably seek relief through internal
grievance processes. If no internal remedy is provided, the employee could
pursue a contractual third-party beneficiary remedy based on the existence
of a contract between NGTF and the employer. NGTF's solicitation was
an offer that the employer accepted by issuing its nondiscrimination policy
statement. In consideration for the affirmance of the employer's policy,
NGTF provides employees and potential employees with knowledge of
that policy. This could increase the productivity of current employees and
increase the pool of qualified applicants for future job openings. If such a
contract exists, the gay employee who is discriminated against may
225. Id. at 481, 595 P.2d at 606, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
226. Id. at 483, 595 P.2d at 606-07, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
227. NGTF is a national gay civil rights organization.
228. NGTF Action Report 4 (April 1978).
229. Friedman, supra note 30, at 572 n. 239; A LEGISLATIVE GUIDE TO GAY RIGHTS 63-64 (1976)
(published by the Portland, Oregon Town Council); NGTF Action Report 4 (April 1978).
230. See text accompanying notes 236-244 infra.
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demand injunctive or monetary relief from the employer for its breach,
through assertion of third-party beneficiary rights.23'
Even if no contract exists, the commitment of an employer may be
enforced under a theory of promissory estoppel.232 An employer
reasonably should expect that its commitment to a nondiscrimination
policy will be relied upon by gay people. The gay applicant may rely on the
policy statement in applying for a job and passing up another job
opportunity in which homosexuality would not be grounds for
discrimination. The gay employee may acknowledge his/her sexual
preference or become active in the gay rights movement in reliance on such
a commitment. The gay employee who openly acknowledges his/her
homosexuality or the gay applicant who accepts a job in reliance on a
commitment to nondiscrimination has relied to his/ her detriment if
discrimination occurs. If there had been no reliance, the employee might
have avoided the harm of discrimination by keeping his/ her sexual
preference hidden or never applying for or accepting a job with the
discriminating employer. In the case of the employee who decides to
acknowledge openly his/her homosexuality, this declaration can hardly be
set aside when the employee discovers that the employer does not intend to
fulfill his/her commitment. Not only the present employment, but all fu-
ture employment opportunities may be limited by this action. A court
could conclude that injustice could be avoided only by enforcing the
promise.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Gay people have become a relatively visible and vocal minority only in
233recent years. 3 Many people have no idea of the effects of discrimination
against gay people-on the individual or on society. Yet these
considerations are of the utmost importance in deciding whether such
discrimination will be tolerated. Public policy is an essential ingredient of
any case presented to ajudge, a jury, or an arbitrator. The legislator must
be given reasons why he/she should support anti-discrimination legisla-
tion.
231. Generally. a third person may enforce a contract if the contract was intended to benefit that
third person, though that person was not a party to the contract, and provided no consideration for the
promise. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 131, 135, 138, 139 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7,
1973).
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965) provides:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on
the part of the promisee ora third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted
for breach may be limited as justice requires.
233. Riots at the Stonewall Inn bar in New York City, N.Y., in the summer of 1969 are
commonly declared to be the turning point of the gay rights movement. E.g., D. ALTMAN, supra note
128, at 117-18. Wilson & Shannon, Homosexual Organizations and the Right of Association, 30
HASTINGS L. J. 1029, 1029 (1979). The incident is cited as the first time large numbers of gay people
fought back in the face of their oppression. D. ALTMAN, supra note 128, at 117.
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No one seriously suggests that discrimination against gay people is a
deterrent to the existence of gay people.234 If that were the case, when
Hitler was burning gay people in Germany235 all gay persons in the country
would have "decided" to be heterosexual. The choice that is presented to a
gay person is either to try to pass236 as heterosexual or be openly gay. There
is great mental and emotional strain involved in trying to seem to be other
than what one is.237 Aside from the constant strain, passing involves the
ever-present danger of discovery of the truth-and the consequences of
238 239discovery are seldom pleasant.238 In Acanfora v. Board of Education,
for example, the Eighth Circuit upheld transfer of a gay teacher to a
nonteaching position on the ground that the teacher made a material
omission in his teaching application by not mentioning his participation in
gay activities. For obvious reasons, most closeted240 gay persons live in
almost constant fear of discovery. Gay persons who are open about their
sexuality, however, are, at the present time, constantly at the mercy of the
whims of employers.24'
The present status of gay persons can affect gay people and society
only in negative ways. Since closeted gay people are in such a precarious
position with respect to their means of supporting themselves, they are
often victims of blackmail.242 Exposure to blackmail, police harassment, 43
and minimal scattered enforcement of laws prohibiting specific sexual
244activities, create contempt for the legal system.
234. After an extensive examination of the literature on the subject of changing sexual
preference, one psychiatrist concludes that reported results of psychotherapy and behavior
modification, "point to a cautious optimism that persons with some heterosexual experience may
develop more, but suggest that persons, especially adult male persons, with no heterosexual
experience, have relatively slight prospects of change." D. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED 275
(1977). Some authorities have found that even if a person wants to change his/her sexual preference, it
cannot be done using any known kind of therapy. C. TRIPP, supra note 131, at 236-38.
235. D. ALTMAN, supra note 128, at 54.
236. To "pass" is defined as: "To be accepted as something different." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 957 (1973).
237. OUR RIGHT TO LOVE: A LESBIAN RESOURCE BOOK 89, 118 (1978) (stresses of beinga closeted
lesbian); OUT OF THE CLOSETS: VOICES OF GAY LIBERATION 8-10 (1977) (one man's experience of
closeted homosexuality).
238. E.g., loss of employment, rejection by family, social disfavor. See D. WEST, supra note 37, at
91.
239. 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
240. Closeted is defined as; "I. Private; concealed; confidential." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 253 (1973).
241. Even in public employment, a person who is openly gay may be accused of flaunting his/ her
sexual preference, and discrimination may be permitted. McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th
Cir. 1971).
242. A. BELL & M. WEINBERG, supra note 1, at 190-93. The possibility of blackmail often is cited
as a reason not to grant security clearances to homosexual persons. If a person is open about their
sexual preference, however, the threat of blackmail is minimal. Rivera, supra note 1, at 829-37.
243. D. ALTMAN, supra note 128, at 45-47.
244.
[N]umerous states prohibit private, consenting homosexuality. Maryland arguably is among
them. . . . [Djespite the substantial activity, no reported case reveals the enforcement of
this law against private homosexuality. . . . The sweeping invasion of privacy which would
necessarily accompany enforcement explains this phenomenon, raising severe questions
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Clearly, society also suffers because of the status of gay persons. Gay
persons who are forced to become unproductive citizens are a resource the
benefit of which society has denied itself. The emotional drain closeted gay
people experience-the constant fear of discovery and resultant loss of
employment-certainly limits their ability to work efficiently. 245 Gay
persons who cannot find employment must be supported by society.246
Therefore, both society and the individual suffer economic losses because
of the status of gay people.
There are not only economic reasons, but also moral reasons for
protecting the rights of gay people in employment. The analysis of Ronald
Dworkin with respect to individuals' moral rights against the state aids in
understanding the relevance of morality in the courts. 247 His theory is that
a person has moral rights against the state if for some reason the state
would do an injustice to treat him/her in a certain way, though it might be
in the general interest to do so. 248 Dworkin does not accept the theory that
democratic institutions can be counted on to protect individual rights,
because all of these institutions have similar interests that are hostile to the
rights of minorities. 249 He concludes that judicial activism through
principled decisions works towards the achievement of moral progress,
that incorrect decisions will be eroded, and that there is danger in a failure
to act.250 Dworkin declares: "[L]aw is no more independent from
philosophy than it is from sociology and economics. '251 The philosophy on
which the United States is based is a philosophy of equality. Implementa-
tion of principles of equality should be a significant element of legal
decisionmaking. Recognition of the right of individuals to be treated justly
by the state, and implementation of principles of equality, call for
protection of gay people's right to equal treatment.
Some protest that homosexuality is illegal and immoral. Homosexual
acts are illegal in many states, 2  but homosexual status is not illegal
anywhere.253 Serious questions concerning the right to privacy254 and
regarding the inner morality of a law beset by internal contradictions and a lack of
congruence between official action and declared rule.
Acanfora v. Board of Educ. 359 F. Supp. 843, 852 (D. Md. 1973), afl'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
245. Kovarsky, supra note 163, at 529-31.
246. Since some gay persons are criminals solely because of their sexual preference, Rivera,
supra note 1, at app. A, their chances to be productive citizens may be eliminated.
247. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
248. Id. at 138-39.
249. Id. at 142-43.
250. Id. at 147-48.
251. Id. at 149.
252. Rivera, supra note I. at app. A.
253. Laws making homosexual status illegal may be held unconstitutional under the Supreme
Court's holding in Robinsonv. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (statute criminalizing status of narcotics
addiction held unconstitutional).
254. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 852 (D. Md. 1973), affd, 491 F.2d 498(4th
Cir.). cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to
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freedom of association " are raised by existing criminal prohibitions. If
one assumes that the criminal prohibitions are valid, it has been estimated
that "95% of all males [have] engaged in some type of sexual play
punishable as a crime.' 256 Since significantly more than five percent of all
males are employed, those who engage in potentially criminal sexual play
must be considered employable. The legality of the consensual sexual
activities in which a person participates in private is not a criterion for
employment of heterosexuals and so should not be a criterion for
employment of gay people. Not only is it important to gay people that their
rights be protected, it is also important to society as a whole. The court in
Acanfora v. Board of Education257 addressed some of the results of
society's continued oppression of gay people:
[S]ociety ...cannot flatter itself as free from the stain of legal persecution.
The chief harm in these laws is the perpetuation of social stigma, cramping
mental development, cowing reason, and repressing human expression for
fear of social disfavor.
Such are the differences in the nature of human beings that unless there is
a corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither obtain their fair
share of happiness nor grow up to the mental, moral and aesthetic stature of
which their nature is capable. . . . Preservation of the atmosphere of
freedom in an imperfect world is furthermore essential to the advancement of
mankind.258
It is essential to the healthy development of the individual and society that
protection of the rights of gay people be recognized.
One court has declared that forcing an employer to hire or retain a gay
employee is equivalent to forcing that employer to condone the gay
259lifestyle. It has probably never occurred to most people that employers
condone all off-duty conduct of their employees. Employers have been
required to retain employees convicted of criminal conduct when that
conduct is not directly related to the employment relationship. 260 If
employment implied employer approval, employers could not be forced to
retain these employees.
Similarly, discrimination against gay people is not justified because
other employees may not want to work with gay people. It is true that
many heterosexual persons do not approve of a gay person's sexual
preference. A recent study, however, indicates that co-workers of gay
Privacy:A Case Study in Human Rightsandthe Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979).
Contra, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,425 U.S. 901(1976) (affirming without opinion lower court
holding that Virginia sodomy statute is constitutional).
255. See generally, Wilson & Shannon, supra note 232.
256. This Kinsey estimate was cited in Kovarsky, supra note 163, at 581 (footnote omitted).
257. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), affd, 491 F.2d 498(4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
258. Id. at 852.
259. McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971).
260. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
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people do not suffer from their association with gay employees.261 A state
agency in Oregon conducted the study and discovered that state employees
who worked with gay people were twice as likely to say they would be
comfortable working with a gay person as a co-worker or superior as those
who had no professional association with gay persons.262 A person may
not be denied a supervisory role because subordinates would not respect
that person based on his/her race or sex.263 Discrimination against gay
people cannot be distinguished by claiming that gay people have chosen
their unpopular position in society. Recent studies refute theories that
there is any significant amount of choice of one's sexual preference.264
III. CONCLUSION
The best way to protect the rights of gay people in private employment
is through the enactment of statutes or the issuance of executive orders that
expressly prohibit discrimination against gay people in private employ-
ment. The most direct way to create this statutory protection would be to
amend Title VII to include sexual preference in the list of impermissible
classifications. 265 At the present time, many city and county statutes do
exist to protect the employment rights of gay people,266 but only a small
number of employers throughout the United States are subject to such
statutes. Like other relatively powerless minorities, gay people must seek
protection through the courts until legislators will confront this
controversial issue.
The legal profession should carefully consider the position of gay
people in this country and note the similarities between their struggles and
the struggles of black people and women for protection of their rights. The
bar should support the efforts of gay people to achieve recognition of their
employment rights. In addition, individual attorneys have an ethical
responsibility, in any particular controversy, zealously to represent their
gay clients' interests.267 Courts also must recognize that this issue is in need
of speedy resolution and must give all due consideration to the matters
involved. The employment of a large minority of Americans, 268 and the
American ideal of equality lie in the balance.
Donna L. Wise
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